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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS K. HOLLAND, dba
American Homes Company,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
10011

SANDI BROWN, aka
Mrs. W. S. Terry,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant's Statement of the Kind of Case launches
into a history of the present litigation in the City Court
of Salt Lake City prior to its appeal by defendant to the
District Court of Salt Lake County. Since the trial in the
Dist,rict Court is a trial de novo such explanation is unnecessary. Defendant also attempts to explain on page 2
of her Brief why the trial took place in her absence. Apparently we are to believe that counsel did not learn of
the trial date until the day before, although the date had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been assigned at pretrial more than 90 days prior, and that
his request for a continuance was denied. As a matter of
fact, the record shows no Motion for a Continuance, and
it is the writer's recollection that no such motion was ever
made and that counsel's only concern with a conflict in
the Murray City Court on the day of trial was that
he be permitted to go to Murray to handle a matte·r which
could be disposed of promptly and return, which request
was granted during the noon recess.
STATEMENT 0'F FACTS
Defendant in her Statement of Facts attempts to
paint a picture of fast talking cookware salesmen who
uprey" on unmarried girls between 18 and 21 years of age.
As a matter of fact, the plaintiff is a married student at
the University of Utah with a family to support and has
been engaged for eight years in Salt Lake City in selling
waterless cookware, china, stainless steel and other similar
items (Tr. 21). His reputation for honesty and fair dealing is not in dispute. The market for the merchandise
plaintiff handles, as defendant well knows, is primarily
among unmarried girls who are contemplating marriage~
since these items are often sought by young ladies to make
part of their trousseau (Tr. 3).
Mr. Merrill Davidson who solicited the particular
sale in question made an initial contact and an appointment to call back the following Friday which was defendant's day off (Tr. 4). At this time, he offered the
defendant a upackage" including some npremiums," for
a price certain (Tr. 5, 6). Mr. Davidson testified as to a
discussion
concerning
a ulay-away"
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by defendant, in view of her financial situation, could
pay as little as $5.00 a month until the full contract price
was paid, and if she were able at any time to increase the
payments to $14.98 per month, a new contract would
be executed (Tr. 8,10). Delivery would immediately be
made in such event since plaintiff would then be able
to sell the new contract to a finance company and get
his money back with which to replenish his stock of merchandise. The defendant signed the conditional sales agreement for the $5.00 per month, paid Merrill Davidson
$1.09 to bind the contract and then, in about a week,
she contacted Mr. Davidson and expressed a desire to
cancel because ((her mother was sick and she had experienced some unexpected bills" (Tr. 12).
Counsel for defendant has failed to quote the trial
record with respect to the real reason for cancellation of
the contract. Mr. Davidson testified that when he called
on Miss Brown after she requested cancellation of the
contract, he found a salesman from a competing company,
a Mr. Roger Phillips of Casual Living Company, in Miss
Brown's apartment (Tr. 13). Miss Brown made the statement that she was going to buy their merchandise instead
of that of plaintiff and Davidson informed her that this
would be foolish in that Miss Brown might then become
liable on two contracts. The salesman from Casual Living
told Mr. Davidson that ((this is a competitive business and
we feel that this type of lay-away contract is fair game
for us and we just like to go out and cancel them and get
the girls on these other contracts" (Tr. 14). Douglas K.
Holland testified that when he and his wife later visited
defendant's apartment, they were informed that Casual
Living's merchandise was there (Tr. 27).
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Mr. Holland further testified that as a result of defendant's breach he lost net profits of $100.00, being the
difference between the cost of the merchandise and the
selling price, less the expenses of the sale (Tr. 28,29). He
stated that there was no available market for the cookware upon the cancellation of the contract by defendant,
except by making the same door-to-door contacts including demonstrations as had been made in the negotiation
of the original contract (Tr. 49).
The Court upon reviewing the verdict of the Jury
to the effect that Plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages of $1.00, plus $75.00 attorney's fees, entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff's: motion
for $100.00, plus the attorney's fee as fixed by the Jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

A conditional sales contract was entered into between
the parties which was valid and enforceable. There is no
evidence whatever of a failure of the minds to meet. Since
defendant had no witnesses at the trial to testify as to her
understanding of the contract, the jury, on proper instruction, found a contract solely on the basis of the testimony of Mr. Davidson. It was clear from his testimony
that the term ((lay-away" had an agreed meaning between
the parties to the contract. No merchandise was actually
telaid away," but delivery was not to occur until such
time as the contract balance was paid, or a new contract
entered into increasing the monthly payment. Since there
was byno
contradiction
as toforthis
understanding
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parties, the Court rightfully refused all instructions submitted by the defendant respecting ((lay-away contracts."

POINT TWO
The plaintiff's measure of damages in this case should
be his lost profits. The only figure testified to by any
witness representing damages in this case was the figure
$100.00 as established by Douglas K. Holland (Tr. 29).
The fact that the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff indicates they found the contract to be valid
and enforceable, but the assessment of damages was without any rhyme or reason whatever. The Court simply
interposed the $100.00 as justified by the evidence for
$1.00 which was without any evidence to sustain it. Complete absence of any evidence to sustain a verdict has
uniformly been held to be a basis for granting a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Morby v. Rogers, 122 Ut.
540,252 P2d 231.
Defendant contends that the plaintiff's damages are
restricted by Title 60-5-2 UCA 1953. That section is set
forth in full at Page 16 of defendant's brief and emphasis is placed on that portion of the statute which reads:
Where there is an available market for the
goods in question, the measure of damages is, in
the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount, the difference
between the contract price and the market or current price at the time or times when the goods
ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was
fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the refusal to accept.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is interesting to note that Paragraph 2 of the same
statute stresses that rr the measure of damages is the loss
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary caurse of
eve-nts from the buyer's breach of contract," and that
Paragraph 4, after emphasizing that plaintiff must mitigate his damages states, rr the profits the seller would have
made if the contract or the sale would have been fully
performed shall be considered in estimating such damages."
The provisions of the Uniform Sales Act have been
fully treated in annotations at 44 ALR 215 and 108 ALR
1482 entitled uMeasure of Damages for Buyer's Repudiation of or Failure to Accept Goods Under Executory
Contract." Many cases are discussed in the annotations
and of particular interest is the general discussion found
at 108 ALR pp. 148 3, 1484, where it is stated, uthe guiding principle is to give the seller the benefit of his contract," and, further:
While express provision is made in the Uniform Sales Act, in force in many states, with respect to the measure of damages for a buyer's
breach, it is said that the seller is not in every case
limited to one of the measures of damages in that
act. (Quoting Morrison vs. M. Finkovitch (1927},
37GeorgiaApp. 57,138 SE 517).
After reading the two annotations cited in ALR the
writer is of the opinion that the measure of damages as
the difference between contract price and the market
price at the time and place of delivery is subject to modification, particularly when it appears that the seller will
not be given the benefit of his contract by such a strict
interpretation
theFunding
act.for digitization
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Utah case which would seem to be controlling on the
subject, Stewart vs. Hansen, 62 Ut. 281, 218 Pac. 959, 44
ALR 340. In that case the action was commenced by an
automobile dealer for damages based upon the buyer's refusal to accept an automobile after entering into a contract of purchase. The Court held that on the buyer's
refusal to accept the automobile, the seller could recover
as damages the profits he would otherwise have realized

and was not limited to the difference between the contract price and the market price. At Page 961, the reasoning is set forth as follows:
If we keep in mind the fact that if in cases
like the one at bar the general rule of damages for
breach of con tracts of sale by the purchaser is
adopted, then the dealer of necessity must in every
case be the loser by reason of the fact that he loses
all compensation for his time and efforts in attempting to effect a sale, or in effecting it, of a
car and in demonstrating it to the prospective
purchaser and receives nothing for rent, advertising and other (overhead' expenses.
How is the situation of the automobile dealer in the
Stewart v. Hansen case any different from that of the
cookware dealer in the instant case? In the Stewart v.
Hansen case the court adopted the law as stated in the
Connecticut case of Torkomian vs. Russell, 90 Conn. 481,
97 Atl. 760. Connecticut had adopted the Uniform Sales
Act and the section found at 60-5-2 UCA 1953 was
therein construed. The Court stated:
In the absence of special circumstances requiring a different rule, the damages recoverable
by a vendor for refusal to take goods contracted
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for is the difference at the time and place of delivery between the contract price and the market
price. But we recognize that this rule is not an
unbending one, that the circumstances may require its modification in order to effectuate the
cardinal purpose, (just compensation for the loss
incurred'; and the loss must be such as tmay reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the
contract.'

* * *
The defendants, as vendors or contractors,
were entitled to show what a Lozier Six car would
have cost them, in the same way a manufacturer
might show the cost of an article manufactured
by him. The defendants would thus recover the
profits they would have made had the plaintiff
carried out his contract. In such a case profits are
not speculative, but certain and ascertainable and
the legitimate fruits of the contract.
In referring to the decision in the T orkomian case,
the Utah Supreme Court at Page 961 of Pacific Reporter
stated that it:
took all matters into consideration and its fairness
and justice in that regard are commendable and
wholesome in that it affords just and fair compensation to the seller without inflicting the slightest
injustice upon the purchaser and is an inducement
to all men to meet the obligations assumed by them
in their contracts. Moreover the rule adopted gives
the seller the fruits of his bargain which is a matter
that should always be considered in applying the
Sponsored by the S.J.
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It is further submitted that in the instant case the
strict interpretation of the Uniform Sales Act cannot
be applied because there is no uavailable market for the
goods." A cursory reading of the two ALR annotations
cited will satisfy the reader that the merchandise involved
in those cases usually is of the nature of timber, coal, hogs,
horses, milk and other such commodities, which do have
an available market. If a buyer breaches a contract to
purchase these commodities, the seller can usually immediately turn to an open market where a price is readily
obtainable for the merchandise. The merchandise sold by
plaintiff in the instant case is a good deal different in that
when the buyer repudiates her contract, the seller cannot
turn to an available market, but rather must go through
the very same process which he went through in the first
instance in seeking out the new customer through referrals or door-to-door canvassing, demonstrating the
merchandise to the satisfaction of the new buyer and obtaining the signature of the new buyer on the contract.
These are the very things the Supreme Court of Utah discusses in the Stewart v. Hansen case, which, in the opinion
of the Court, constituted such circumstances as would
justify a departure from the strict rule. As stated by the
annotater at 108 ALR 1487:
0'f course, the circumstances may be such that
it is impossible or impracticable to apply the rule
allowing the seller the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time and
place of delivery. This is true where the goods have

no market value, or where the rule if applied would
work serious injustice. In such cases the rule is
generally disregarded, the courts holding that as
a measure of damages, it is of value only so far as
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it puts the parties in the position they would have
been in if the contract had been carried out and
that where it does not lead to this result, other criteria must be employed.
In the Georgia case of Morrison vs. Finkovitch, supra,
the Court stated:
The rule which * * * allows recovery of the
difference between the contract price and the
market price at the time and place of delivery is
founded upon the just theory that the seller on

rejection of the goods may take them into the open
market and obtain the current price for them.
The plaintiff's testimony in the instant case that the goods
could be sold by Hgoing out and knocking on doors and
just rounding up a new customer" (Tr. 49) does not, by
implication, mean that there is an Hopen market" and
ucurrent price" available for the goods. As stated by Mr.
Holland, Hit's just like making a sale all over again. You
can't just call on someone to buy it. You have to go out
and find someone" (Tr. 49).
McCall vs. Jennings, 26 Utah 459, 73 Pac. 639 cited
by defendant contains an instruction Hcorrectly setting
forth the law in the abstract, but inapplicable when applied to the pleadings in the case." Since the case was reversed on other grounds it is difficult to determine what
weight should be attached to the decision as it treats
damages for breach of executory contracts. It is noteworthy that no discussion is made of special circumstances
as in Stewart vs. Hansen, supra. Love vs. St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. 51 Utah 305, 169 Pac. 951, treats damages in
the breach of an executory contract to purchase horses,
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an example of property for which there is an uopen" and
uavailable" market and is thus distinguishable· on its facts.
POINT THREE

The contract contemplates the payment of an attorneys fee. The fact that defendant breached the contract before delivery could be made, thus making the
provision respecting repossession and sale inapplicable,
should not deprive plaintiff of a reasonable attorney's fee
for enforcing the contract to recover damages for its
breach.
CO·NCLUSION
The la.w permits plaintiff in this case the benefit of
his bargain. If the defendant now considers her contract
to be a foolish one, she should not expect this Court to
act as her guardian. She was of legal age at the time of
the contract and fully understood its terms. She chose to
accept the ulegal advice" of a competing cookware salesman and refused to perform her obligations under the
contract. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict of the Trial Court should be
affirmed.
ALLEN M. SWAN
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
428 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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